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1. Introduction  
 
Starting with his ground-breaking article “Normative requirements” (Broome 1999) John 
Broome has shaped the contemporary debate about rationality in a series of influential 
papers.2 His main objective has been to develop and defend the thesis that rationality amounts 
to satisfying rational requirements and to reject the view that rationality consists in responding 
correctly to reasons. Broome applies his requirement-based account of rationality to 
theoretical and practical rationality: Rational requirements, so his thesis goes, regulate the 
relations among our mental attitudes, beliefs as well as intentions.  
 
The most important requirements for ordering our beliefs are Belief Consistency (the 
requirement not to believe that p if you believe that not-p) and Belief Closure (the requirement 
to believe that q if you believe that p and that if p then q). The crucial requirements for 
practical reasoning are Intention Coherence (the requirement not to intend to X if you intend 
not to X), and Instrumental Reasoning (the requirement to intend to M if you intend E and 
believe that your realizing E requires that you M). There is another requirement of rationality 
Broome considers to be particularly important, namely Enkrasia which says: rationality 
requires of you that, if you believe you ought to F, you intend to F3. Enkrasia provides 
according to Broome a link between theoretical and practical rationality. 
 
                                                            
1 For critical comments on a former version of this article and many suggestions for revisions I would like to 
thank Fabienne Peter and J. David Velleman. I also thank Sorin Baiasu, Ben Bramble and Christoph Hanisch and 
for a helpful discussion of an earlier draft of the paper. Research for this paper has been funded by the ERC-
Advanced Research Grant “Distortions of Normativity”. 
2 The most important are (Broome 2002), (Broome 2004), (Broome 2007), (Broome 2008), (Broome 2009). 
3 The full formulation of Enkrasia is: 
Rationality requires of N that, if 
(1) N believes at t that she herself ought that p, and if 
(2) N believes at t that, if she herself were then to intend that p, because of that, p would be so, and if 
(3) N believes at t that, if she herself were not then to intend that p, because of that, p would not be so, then 
(4) N intends at t that p (Broome 2013, 170). 
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As these examples show, requirements do have a distinctive logical structure: they have the 
form of a conditional. Rational requirements, as Broome famously used to put it, contain a 
wide-scope ought; reason-based requirements, however, contain a narrow-scope ought. A 
wide scope rational requirement tells you to bring your attitudes into order, for example, by 
avoiding inconsistency, or by reaching means-end coherence, or by bringing your intentions 
in line with your beliefs. Explicating rationality via wide-scope rational requirements ties 
rationality to a reasoning process, whereas the “responding correctly to reasons”-approach, as 
I read Broome’s criticism, neglects that important aspect.  
 
In his new book Rationality through Reasoning Broome aims to show in detail how 
rationality works through reasoning. The book offers much more than a concise presentation 
of his main arguments over the years. Broome has pushed his analysis of rationality much 
further, and in several parts of the book he presents revised versions of his earlier positions. 
 
The main focus of the book is on answering what Broome calls the motivation question, 
namely: how can we explain that our beliefs about what we ought to do often cause a 
corresponding intention? Broome raises this question in chapter 1 and provides his answer, 
which rests on a defense of the encratic principle, in the final chapter of the book. The 
intermediate chapters develop the tools he needs for his answer to the motivation question. In 
addition, the book also discusses and analyzes several issues relevant to our understanding of 
rationality in an admirably thorough way. 
 
To give a quick overview: Ch. 2 and 3 focus on the concept of ‘ought’. Broome argues that 
there is a central notion of ‘ought’ which is captured by Enkrasia. Ch. 4 offers an analysis of 
reasons, introducing a distinction between pro toto and pro tanto reasons. Pro toto reasons 
offer explanations for why an agent ought to X whereas pro tanto reasons offer weighing 
explanations. In ch. 5 and 6 Broome summarizes his arguments against the view that 
rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons, and he explains why he does not think 
that responding correctly to reason-beliefs (= a person’s beliefs about the reasons there are) 
offers a better solution. In ch. 7-10 he discusses the nature of requirements, especially the 
meaning of conditional requirements and synchronic as well as diachronic requirements. 
Ch.10 focuses on the question whether rationality is normative. Broome is sceptical: He 
thinks rationality is normative in its own right, but concedes that he has no decisive argument 
to show why this is so. In ch. 12-16 Broome discusses in more detail the reasoning process 
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implied by rational requirements. The main idea is that correct reasoning is not required but 
permitted by rationality. Ch. 12 and 13 discuss the distinction between higher-order reasoning 
and first-order reasoning. Broome claims that reasoning that satisfies rational requirements is 
first-order reasoning. In ch. 14 and ch. 15 Broome depicts practical reasoning and its relation 
to theoretical reasoning. He is careful to emphasize the independence of practical reasoning 
from theoretical reasoning and thus revises his earlier approach, which tied practical 
reasoning too closely to a logical-theoretical form of reasoning. In the final ch.16 Broome 
elucidates the structure of enkratic reasoning, showing how it meets the principle of Enkrasia.  
 
In the following discussion I will focus on two issues. First, does Broome offer new and 
convincing arguments for his claim that rationality is a matter of fulfilling rational 
requirements and not a matter of responding correctly to reasons? Second, is Broome’s 
depiction of the reasoning process and his account of first-order reasoning appropriate? More 
specifically, is his claim that first-order reasoning involves no appeal to reasons and thus no 
normative thinking tenable?  
 
With regard to the first question, I will argue that Broome’s claim that rationality can be 
explained merely as satisfying rational requirements is implausible. As to the second question, 
I will criticize Broome’s claim that we do not need “to impute a normative thought to the 
reasoner” (Broome 2012, sec. 4).4 Such a thesis amounts already to an inaccurate picture of 
theoretical and practical reasoning, but is especially problematic when it comes to enkratic 
reasoning. 
 
2. Rationality and Responding Correctly to Reasons 
 
Broome expresses the hope to “have done enough to scotch th(e) view” that rationality 
consists in responding correctly to reasons (Broome 2013, 107). His main strategy for 
undermining the “responding correctly to reasons”-account of rationality is to raise objections 
against the following condition: 
   
Equivalence: Necessarily, you are rational if and only if you respond correctly to reasons 
(Broome 2013, 72). 
 
                                                            
4 This essay is the basis for (Broome 2013, sec 13.5).  
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Crucial for his objection is the way Broome spells out Equivalence, namely into  
Equivalence analysed: Necessarily, you are rational if and only if, whenever your reasons 
require you to F, you F and an appropriate explanatory or counterfactual connection (relation) 
holds between your reasons and your Fing (Broome 2013, 74). 
 
This implies5 the 
 
Core Condition: Necessarily, if you are rational, you F whenever your reasons require you to 
F (Broome 2013, 74). 
 
Broome raises “a quick objection” to Equivalence which runs as follows: It might be that your 
reasons require you to F, yet you do not believe your reasons require you to F. So you do not 
F, but, Broome assumes, you may still be rational. Therefore the Core Condition is false. 
Given the entailment relation between the Core Condition and Equivalence, Equivalence is 
also false (Broome 2013, 74f.). The bulk of ch. 5 defends the “quick objection” through a 
careful refutation of possible objections. I skip the details here.6 The upshot is that Broome 
rejects Equivalence as wrong, but also the converse propositions contained by it, namely 
Entailment (Necessarily, if you are rational you respond correctly to reasons) and Sufficiency 
of reasons (Necessarily, if you respond correctly to reasons you are rational).  
   
Broome’s claim that rationality is exclusively a matter of fulfilling rational requirements 
seems implausible. There is a fairly easy way to see this.7 Recall that Broome defines rational 
requirements in terms of a wide scope conditional. Take the Instrumental Requirement, 
formulated by Broome as:  
 
IR 1: Rationality requires (If you intend E and believe that M is a necessary means to E and 
that your M-ing is necessary to realize E, then form the intention to M).8  
                                                            
5 Via the intermediate step Entailment analysed: Necessarily, if you are rational then, whenever your reasons 
require you to F, you F and an appropriate explanatory or counterfactual connection holds between your reasons 
and your F-ing (Broome 2013, 74). 
6 A detailed discussion of Broome’s intriguing arguments would be the topic of a separate paper. 
7 This point has been extensively discussed in the literature. 
8  See e.g. (Broome 2004, 29). Broome’s most recent formulation of the instrumental requirement is:  
Rationality requires of N that if 
1) N intends at t that e, and if 
2) N believes at t that, if m were not so, because of that e would not be so, and if 
3) N believes at t that, if she herself were not then to intend m, because of that m would not be so, then 
4) N intends at t that m (Broome 2013, 159). 
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IR 1 is logically equivalent to: 
IR 2: Rationality requires (you do not intend E or you do not believe that M is a necessary 
means to E or you form the intention to M).9  
This shows that the Instrumental Requirement can be fulfilled in several ways: by forming the 
intention to M, or by giving up the intention to E, or by giving up the belief that M-ing is a 
necessary means to E. The wide scope account of rational requirement does not reach further 
than revealing the formal structure of the requirement and how to satisfy it. 
Surely, however, our expectations concerning rationality go beyond elucidating the formal 
features of rational requirements. Rationality should not leave us in limbo about how to 
satisfy a rational requirement and our choice between the various options should not be 
arbitrary. In so far as we are rational agents, we need to make a justified choice between the 
alternative ways of satisfying the requirement. Since rational requirements as such do not tell 
us how to accomplish that, a further standard of rationality is obviously needed. In choosing 
between alternative ways of meeting a rational requirement in a rationally justified way, we 
need to consider carefully what reasons we have for taking the one or the other option, which 
entails a weighing of reasons. Thus, as some philosophers claim, rationality is also a matter of 
responding correctly to reasons. 
The problem for Broome’s position arises because the wide scope formulation entails the 
symmetry of the alternative ways of meeting the instrumental requirement. But the situation 
in which the requirement applies is, as some philosophers have objected, one where an agent 
intends end E.10 Thus, claiming that the instrumental requirement can equally be fulfilled by 
giving up the end E, or by taking the means, or by giving up the belief that M-ing is a 
necessary means to E misrepresents the agent’s deliberative context. In a situation in which 
you intend end E, it would be rational to intend M if you believe M is a means implied by E; 
but it would be irrational not to believe M is a means implied by E because you do not intend 
M.  
 
The symmetry problem also affects the principle of Enkrasia. The wide scope formulation of a 
requirement takes the form of a conditional, i.e. ‘if p then q’. Applied to Enkrasia we get:  
 
                                                            
9 The intermediate step is: Rationality requires [not (intending to E and believing that your M-ing is a necessary 
means to E) or form the intention to M)]. 
10 This objection was first raised by (Schroeder 2004); for a rejection of the symmetry objection see (Way 2009). 
For a solution of the symmetry problem through introducing the notion of ‘rational commitment’ see (Shpall 
2013). 
 6 
Enkrasia 1: Rationality requires of you (if you believe you ought to F, then you intend to F) 
 
which is by contraposition logically equivalent to: 
 
Enkrasia 2: Rationality requires of you (if you do not intend to F, you do not believe you 
ought to F). 
 
Broome is aware that Enkrasia seems “symmetrical between believing you ought to F and not 
intending to F” (Broome 2013, 139). However, the relation between your believing you ought 
to F and your not intending to F should be asymmetrical since “(i)t would be rational for you 
to intend to F because you believe you ought to F, but irrational for you not to believe you 
ought to F because you do not intend to F” (Broome 2013, 139). He tries to solve the 
symmetry problem - not surprisingly - by appealing to further requirements of rationality.  
 
Broome comes up with two suggestions. First, he mentions the possibility that further 
requirements might apply which account for the asymmetry in Enkrasia. For example, you 
might be subject to a Modus Ponens Requirement of the form: Rationality requires of N that, 
if N believes at t that p, and N believes at t that if p then q, and if N cares at t whether q, then 
N believes at t that q (Broome 2013, 157). If you have, Broome argues, “grounding beliefs” 
which entail by modus ponens that you ought to F, and you care about whether you ought to 
F, then you are according to the Modus Ponens Requirement not rational if you do not believe 
you ought to F. Together with the requirement (you are not rational if you believe you ought 
to F and do not intend to F) it follows that, “given your grounding beliefs, you can be rational 
only if you believe you ought to F and you intend to F” (Broome 2013, 140). The grounding 
belief, he argues, blocks the symmetry. 
 
But second, and more importantly, Broome claims that there are “basing prohibitions of 
rationality” which forbid basing some particular attitude – or lack of an attitude – on another 
particular attitude. He thus tries to fix the symmetry problem by introducing the following 
requirement: Rationality requires of you that you do not (not believe you ought to F on the 
basis of your not intending to F) (Broome 2013, 141)11. 
 
                                                            
11 In his formulation of the requirement Broome omits the brackets. 
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Neither suggestion is, I think, convincing. In the case of Broome’s first proposal, the decisive 
factor in discarding the symmetry is the grounding belief which entails that you ought to F. A 
belief, however, can only be a grounding one if there are strong reasons (in Broome’s 
terminology a pro toto reason) for the belief. The statement that “given your grounding 
beliefs, you can be rational only if you believe you ought to F and you intend to F” merely is 
another way of saying that your belief that you ought to F is supported so strongly by reasons 
(evidence) so that you are not rational if you do not believe that you ought to F – which, by 
Enkrasia entails that you intend to F.      
 
A similar problem affects Broome’s second suggestion, namely ruling out the symmetry by 
introducing a basing prohibition. The plausibility of the basing prohibition clearly rests on the 
fact that your not intending to F cannot be a reason for your not believing that you ought to F. 
The presence or absence of your intention to F is not a reason for or against that you believe 
you ought to F. 
 
Broome might reject this objection by claiming that he relies on an inferential interpretation 
of basing. He distinguishes between two types of basing, namely basing that relies on 
evidence (“evidential basing”) and basing that relies on inferences (“inferential basing”) 
(Broome 2013, 188f.). For a large part, our beliefs are based on evidence. But often, and this 
holds according to Broome especially with respect to issues of rationality, beliefs are not 
directly based on evidence, but - via inference - on other beliefs. Broome’s example: your 
belief that you are pregnant can be based inferentially on your beliefs that (1) the test paper is 
orange and (2) if the test paper is orange then you are pregnant (Broome 2013, 188). It seems 
to me, however, that the rationality or irrationality of your believing that you are pregnant 
cannot be assessed without taking into account whether the beliefs functioning as premises in 
your inference are based on evidence or not – in other words, whether there are reasons for 
holding them.  
 
Accounting for the asymmetry by appealing to reasons allows for a straightforward answer to 
the symmetry problem. With respect to the Instrumental Requirement this means: If you have 
strong reasons to intend end E, then it is not rational to give up the intention to E simply 
because you do not intend to M. For example, if you intend to lose weight because the doctor 
ordered you to do so (otherwise you risk suffering a heart attack), then it is irrational of you to 
give up this end because you do not intend to give up your excessive chocolate eating (which 
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is the means implied by E). Thus, the way the IR requirement is satisfied is not symmetrical 
between giving up the end and not intending the means.  
 
In the case of Enkrasia, the asymmetry plays out as follows. If you have strong reasons for 
believing you ought to F, so that, for example, your belief that you ought to F rests on an all 
things considered judgment, then there is support for your intending to F. Conversely, your 
not intending to F cannot be a reason (= a basis) for your not believing you ought to F. Thus 
the problem that the requirement of Enkrasia can be met by satisfying the consequent (you do 
not believe you ought to F) on the basis of the antecedent (you do not intend to F) does not 
arise. 
 
I do not want to claim that rationality is exclusively a matter of “responding correctly to 
reasons” and that rational requirements play no role. My point is rather that a proper account 
of rationality should also take into account that rationality requires reflecting on the reasons 
we have for holding or not holding beliefs and for forming or not forming particular 
intentions.12  
 
Broome seems to identify the “responding-to-reasons”-approach with a simple reactive 
structure of the mind, aligning rationality with a sort of immediate isolated response to 
particular facts or beliefs about facts without any mental process relating the various 
responses and bringing them into order.13 Nothing, however, excludes the connection between 
reasons and a reasoning process.14 Taking reasons into account inevitably involves one in 




                                                            
12 Broome concedes that responding correctly to reasons cannot be ruled out completely; rationality at least 
“entails responding correctly to your reason-beliefs” (Broome 2013, 90). This concession is a consequence of his 
acceptance of Enkrasia. Broome grants that Enkrasia can be reformulated as ‘Rationality requires of you that, if 
you believe your reasons require you to F, you intend to F’ (Broome 2013, 90). He also accepts the Enkratic 
Condition: Necessarily, if you are rational, you intend to F whenever you believe your reasons require you to F 
(Broome 2013, 89). 
13 A similar critique is voiced by Korsgaard; she associates the “responding correctly to reasons”-account with 
interpreting reason as a merely “receptive” faculty (Korsgaard 2009, 24). 
14 Defenders of a “responding correctly to reasons”-account of rationality do not ignore that rationality is tied to 
reasoning. Joseph Raz, for example, states that “a minimal reasoning ability” by which he means the ability to 
grasp inferential relations “is among the constituents of capacity-rationality” (Raz 1999, 69).  
 9 
The second issue I want to discuss is Broome’s account of reasoning. Rationality consists, he 
argues, not merely in meeting rational requirements, but in meeting them in a special way, 
namely through our own reasoning processes. 
According to Broome, reasoning is a conscious activity taking you from premise-attitudes 
(belief, intention) to a conclusion-attitude (either a belief or an intention) (Broome 2013, 221). 
A causal process is involved: your premise-attitudes cause you to have a conclusion-attitude, 
but the causing relation is merely necessary, not sufficient.15 Important for reasoning is also 
your having a belief that links the premises to the conclusion (linking belief)16 and your 
operating on the contents of your premise-attitudes in a rule-governed way to construct the 
content of your conclusion-attitude (operating condition) (Broome 2013, 229-232). Reasoning 
is correct if it follows a correct rule.17 Broome defends a first-order account of reasoning 
which means that you reason with your attitudes and also about their contents, but you do not 
reason about your attitudes (Broome 2013, 242).  
Broome illustrates this with the standard cases of theoretical and practical reasoning, modus 
ponens reasoning and instrumental reasoning. The relevant reasoning schemas are (Broome 
2013, 252): 
Theoretical reasoning                                                   Practical reasoning 
From <p; belief> and        From <p; intention> and 
<if p then q; belief> to derive      <if p then q; belief> to derive 
<q; belief>.         <q; intention>. 
  
As mentioned, Broome’s claim that first-order reasoning involves no normative thoughts on 
the side of the reasoner is, in my view, mistaken. By ‘normative thoughts’ he means 
‘appealing to reasons’. His worry is that taking reasons into account amounts to a higher-order 
                                                            
15 The reason for Broome is: Belief in a premise might cause you to have a belief-conclusion, but might not be 
reasoning. His example: You might be in a strange mental condition so that believing that it rains brings you to 
hearing trumpets. The example also shows that reliability is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for 
reasoning. The process bringing you to hear trumpets when you belief that it is raining might be reliable given 
your weird mental condition; nevertheless the process is not an instance of reasoning. 
16 The linking belief in theoretical reasoning (reasoning with beliefs) is implication; the rule might be modus 
ponens or modus tollens (Broome 2013, 229). Non-deviance means to rule out „psychological quirks“ such as 
weird mental conditions causing you e.g. to hear trumpets when you belief that it is raining.  
17 However, following an incorrect rule might still count as reasoning. Two kinds of mistake are possible: you 
can reason according to an incorrect rule or you can make a mistake in following a rule which might be correct 
or incorrect. Broome evades the problem how to determine whether you follow a correct or an incorrect rule by 
simply claiming that “reasoning is correct if and only if it correctly follows a correct rule” (Broome 2013, 242). 
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account of reasoning that is prone to a vicious regress. This seems wrong to me and here is 
why.  
Broome defines a higher-order account of reasoning as one in which a higher-order belief 
may be part of the premises. Broome mentions two ways in which this might happen: either a 
premise-belief is already a higher-order belief (a second-order belief) or a higher-order 
linking belief, a belief in the principle or rule of your reasoning, is part of the premises. 
Broome sometimes gives the impression that both ways lead to a regress. However, a closer 
look shows that only the second gives rise to an infinite regress and thus renders a satisfactory 
account of reasoning impossible. 
 
A regress in the first case would only come about if you were to justify your second-order 
belief by a third-order belief, the third-order belief by a fourth-order belief, and so on. 
However, Broome himself claims that such a regress can be stopped already at the level of a 
second-order belief. His example is enkratic reasoning. Broome concedes that enkratic 
reasoning starts with a second-order normative belief, namely believing that one ought to F. 
However, no regress is initiated. He writes:  
 
“Enkratic reasoning […] inevitably involves a second-order normative belief […].  
But on my account it involves no belief that has an order higher than that one. It is not 
a higher-order account […] It has the character of first-order reasoning…” (Broome 
2013, 211).   
 
In the second case, however, when the linking belief is included in the premises, the infinite 
regress is inevitable. The linking belief, as Broome rightly emphasizes, cannot be part of the 
premise-beliefs. If it were, the only justification of the linking belief that you can give is by 
appealing to a more complex formulation of the linking belief which contains the initial 
linking belief. This way you end up in an infinite regress of justification forcing you to 
provide more and more complex formulations of the linking belief (Broome 2013, 230).18 In 
                                                            
18 If the linking belief is part of the premises you would, for example, have the following inference pattern:  
(1) It is raining.  
(2) If it is raining, the snow will melt. 
(3) If (it is raining and if it is raining the snow will melt) then the snow will melt. 
Therefore the snow will melt.  
Since the linking belief is part of the premise-beliefs, you need another linking belief to explain how the 
premise-beliefs are connected to the conclusion. This would have to be the belief that if (it is raining and, if it is 
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order to rule out that the linking belief is part of the premises, Broome draws a clear line 
between a premise-belief and a linking belief with the help of the operating condition: 
Reasoning is an operation on the contents of your premise-beliefs, but you do not operate on 
the content of the linking belief (Broome 2013, 234). 
Broome’s thesis that first-order reasoning does not include normative elements rests on the 
claim that invoking reasons and oughts would amount to a higher-order account of reasoning, 
giving rise to an infinite regress. Broome’s argument can be found in his critique of Paul 
Boghossian’s account of inference. According to Boghossian, inferring q from p includes 
taking a specific attitude to q, namely to judge that q because you take “the (presumed) truth 
of p to provide support for q” (Boghossian 2012, sec 3). For example, my inferring (3) ‘The 
streets are wet’ from (1) ‘It rained last night’ and (2) ‘If it rains, then the streets are wet’ 
amounts thus to “arriving at the judgment that (3) in part because I take the presumed truth of 
(1) and (2) to provide support for (3)” (Boghossian 2012, sec. 3).  
Boghossian claims that inference presupposes the “Taking Condition”: “Inferring necessarily 
involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion 
because of that fact” (Boghossian 2012, sec. 3). Inferring thus involves two aspects: coming 
to a conclusion and adopting a certain attitude to the conclusion, namely considering it to be 
true.  
I do not want to take a stance on whether Boghossian offers an appropriate account of 
inference or rather an explanation of how inferences support your beliefs.19 What is relevant 
for my discussion are Broome’s objections to this account, which captures more or less what 
Broome means by ‘reasoning’. Broome interprets the two aspects in Boghossian’s account as 
amounting to two separate stages of reasoning and thus to a problematic kind of a higher-
order account of reasoning. The crucial passage reads:  
“But if there were these two stages, at the end of the first stage the conclusion would 
be parked somewhere in your consciousness, without your having any particular 
attitude towards it. We would have to explain how you then come to take up the 
attitude. The explanation could not go through your believing you ought to have it, or 
your intending to have it. How would you come to acquire that belief or that intention? 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
raining the snow will melt, and if (it is raining and if it is raining the snow will melt) then the snow will melt)) 
then the snow will melt. And so you are in an infinite regress formulating always more complicated linking 
beliefs (Broome 2013, 230). The classical case for this problem is Lewis Carroll’s discussion of the argument 
between the tortoise and Achilles.  
19 For a critique see e.g. (Wright 2012, sec. 1) who objects that Boghossian is not talking about inference, but 
about “coming to believe a proposition on the basis of inference. That is not inference per se. Inference is rather, 
one would suppose, a proper ingredient in it”. 
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And if you did, how would it bring you to take up the attitude towards the conclusion? 
It is the higher-order account that claims you come to believe the conclusion this way, 
and I have rejected that account” (Broome 2013, 243).  
This interpretation seems problematic, however. Recall: Broome rejects the higher-order 
account of reasoning because it gives rise to an infinite regress. But the regress only looms if 
the linking belief is part of the premise-beliefs, that is to say, if you include the belief in the 
rule of inference among the premises. Nothing like this is going on in Boghossian’s account 
of inference.20 All that Boghossian claims is that for inferring you need an awareness of your 
belief and an attitude to the conclusion – considering it to be true.  
This relation to truth is, as several philosophers have pointed out, indispensable for reasoning 
with beliefs (Velleman 2000, Shah 2003, Velleman and Shah 2005). There is a kind of 
conceptual tie between belief and truth so that a first-order account of reasoning with beliefs 
includes your considering whether or not your beliefs are true.  
The connection between belief and truth is crucial for distinguishing between a mere logical 
derivation and reasoning. Think of a logical exercise: you can successfully derive the 
conclusion from the premises by a valid logical rule, and the conclusion might be false since 
the premises are false. In logic you follow the rule and endorse it in what Broome calls a weak 
normative sense. However, in reasoning you are interested in whether your premise-beliefs 
support your conclusion-belief. Hence taking up a truth-governed attitude to your premise-
beliefs and conclusion-belief is indispensable. Here you endorse your premise-beliefs and 
your conclusion-beliefs in a strong normative sense. 
Interestingly enough, Broome sees all that. He does not deny that reasoning involves those 
two aspects, namely following a rule and taking up an attitude towards your premise-beliefs 
and conclusion-belief. Broome describes his first-order account of reasoning in the following 
way:  
“On the first-order account, reasoning is not split into the two stages. You adopt an 
attitude as you work out its content. Belief reasoning appears to you as the process of 
discovering a truth” (Broome 2013, 243).  
 
Broome thus concedes that reasoning includes taking up an attitude to the conclusion. 
Reflecting on your attitudes and assessing whether you can endorse them or not, is 
                                                            
20 Boghossian is eager to avoid the regress problem (Boghossian 2012, sec. 6). 
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indispensable for reasoning. A consequence is that a first-order account of reasoning invokes 
reasons. Believing involves, as David Velleman expresses it, “being subject to reasons” 
(Velleman 2000, 186).21 Equally, practical reasoning engages you in reflecting on whether 
you can endorse your intentions and that reflection will depend on the reasons you have for 
those intentions. 
Broome is forced to accept all this. This is apparent when we consider what he says about the 
“direction of reasoning” (Broome 2013, 243). You can, he points out, satisfy the Modus 
Ponens Requirement (Rationality requires of N that, if N believes at t that p, and N believes at 
t that if p then q, and if N cares at t whether q, then N believes at t that q) in two ways: either 
by reasoning with modus ponens or by reasoning in the reverse way by modus tollens.  
Now, Broome is here not talking merely about the logical validity of modus ponens and 
modus tollens; he is interested in how theoretical reasoning can make use of those two rules. 
You can come to a conclusion by modus ponens; however, if you come to the belief that the 
conclusion is false, modus tollens reasoning brings you to give up the initial premise-belief. 
“(T)heoretical reasoning”, Broome argues, “will often cause you to drop one or more of your 
initial beliefs, rather than acquire a new one” (Broome 2013, 243-4). His example is telling. 
You might reason from the premises (1) ‘Platypuses are mammals’ and (2) ‘If Platypuses are 
mammals, then Platypuses do not lay eggs’ to the conclusion (3) ‘Platypuses do not lay eggs’. 
However, you might not believe the conclusion as you have seen a Platypus laying eggs. This 
belief leads you to reverse your reasoning and (by modus tollens) to drop the belief that 
platypuses are mammals.  
 
Broome characterizes the reasoning in the platypus-case as “a failed attempt at reasoning by 
modus ponens, followed by a successful piece of reasoning by modus tollens” (Broome 2013, 
244). But this characterization is inaccurate given Broome’s own conditions for reasoning. 
Both pieces of reasoning (the one working by modus ponens, the other by modus tollens) are 
successful in terms of coming to a conclusion. The only difference between them is that the 
conclusion in the modus ponens case is wrong; in the modus tollens case the conclusion is 
true. However, to call the reasoning by modus ponens a failed attempt of reasoning one has to 
move beyond mere logical derivation and associate theoretical reasoning with assessing the 
truth or the falsity of the conclusion. In other words, since both instances of reasoning rely on 
valid logical rules, the characterization of ‘successful’ or ‘failed’ makes sense only if you 
                                                            
21 And Velleman adds that “my sensitivity to reasons for believing […] is not a second-order aim of having true 
beliefs but rather the first-order aim that makes my acceptance of something into a belief” (Velleman 2000, 186).  
 14 
align reasoning with judging the conclusion on the basis of your evidence (reasons). 
Boghossian’s taking condition - you take the premises to support the conclusion - is just 
another way of saying this.  
That the direction of your reasoning must be backed by reasons also holds for instrumental 
reasoning, which Broome considers to be the standard case of practical reasoning. The formal 
structure is:  from <e; intention> and <m is a means implied by e; belief>, and <m is up to 
me; belief> derive <m; intention> (Broome 2013, 259). You might reason from the intention 
‘I intend to run and finish the marathon beginning of April’and the belief ‘my running 7 miles 
per day from January to end of March is a means implied by my running and finishing the 
marathon beginning of April’ together with the belief ‘my running 7 miles per day from 
January to end of March is up to me’ to the conclusion ‘I intend to run 7 miles daily’. The 
recognition that you cannot realize your intention to run seven miles daily because of your 
professional duties can bring you to drop your intention to run the marathon. Again, a stance 
on your conclusion is necessary. Practical reasoning involves an assessment of your intentions 
– whether they are realizable and make sense given your overall situation and context.  
The problem is even more striking in the case of enkratic reasoning, i.e. reasoning that meets 
the requirement of Enkrasia. Broome distinguishes between weak and strong normativity. 
Weak normativity means complying with some standard or following some rule; normativity 
in the strong sense involves “reasons or ought” (Broome 2012, sec 4). Broome wants to avoid 
strong normativity in reasoning. With respect to Enkrasia, however, Broome obviously cannot 
rule out reasons and oughts. He grants that enkratic reasoning involves a second-order belief, 
a belief about what you ought to do, but he wants the reasoning process to stop there. But the 
process only stops at the level of the second-order belief if you have an all things considered 
belief that you ought to F. This means, on Broome’s own definition, that you have taken all 
the relevant considerations into account in assessing whether you are justified in holding the 
belief that you ought to F. This assessment depends on the reasons you have for believing you 
ought to F.  
In the territory of rationality the belief that you ought to F cannot merely be an arbitrary 
assumption like the weird premises you might use in logical derivations. It must be a belief 
that is justified. If not, your reasoning to the intention would not be justified. You have to take 
the belief that you ought to F to be a reason for your forming the intention.  
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One more point. We have seen that Broome, in developing a first-order account of reasoning, 
stays close to the logical rules of reasoning. However, when it comes to enkratic reasoning, 
Broome moves beyond the rules of logic.  
The example of enkratic reasoning he provides is (Broome 2013, 288): 
I ought to take a break. 
So I shall take a break. 
Broome then specifies this in more detail. Enkratic reasoning is only correct if it complies 
with the following rule (Broome 2013, 290):  
From 
1. <I ought that p; belief> and 
2. <It is up to me whether or not p, belief> to derive 
3. <p; intention> 
The example now runs:  
1. I ought to take a break. 
2. It is up to me whether or nor to take a break. 
3. So I shall take a break. 
For Broome this is correct enkratic reasoning.  
Olav Gjelsvik criticizes Broome’s depiction of enkratic reasoning and suggests the following 
reformulation (Gjelsvik 2013, 474)22:  
      1.   I (If I ought to take a break then I shall take a break.) 
2. B (I ought to take a break.) 
3.   I (I shall take a break.) 
Gjelsvik’s re-formulation aligns enkratic reasoning with following a logical rule. The first 
premise amounts to an intention (If I ought to take a break then I shall take a break). Together 
with a belief you then come to a further intention by modus ponens. 
In Broome’s version you go from two beliefs to an intention. The forming of the intention is 
hidden in the step from 2 to 3. Believing that it is up to you whether or not to take a break 
together with your belief that you ought to take a break only brings you to form the intention 
                                                            
22 Gjelsvik talks of ‚practical reasoning’ when referring to Broome’s ‘enkratic reasoning’.  
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to take the break in case you are committed to the rule that you will form an intention to F in 
case you belief you ought to F. But such a rule is not given to you by logic. Broome’s second 
premise (it is up to me whether or not to take a break) amounts to a volition. Without an act of 
will you do not get to form the intention-conclusion. This raises the issue of the connection  
between rationality and agency, a topic which remains largely unexplored in Broome’s book.  
 
In Rationality through Reasoning Broome makes a determined effort to present an account of 
rationality that meets challenging criticisms of his earlier attempts. The objections have been 
that Broome’s emphasis on rational requirements turn rationality into an enterprise of 
formulating agent-neutral abstract norms with no relation to you as an agent. Broome tries to 
answer those objections. However, in sticking firmly to the project of providing a solely 
requirement-based account of rationality, Broome ignores the demand for rationality as a form 
of critical reflection on reasons.23 The question, however, is not only what requirements 
rationality asks us to fulfil, but how making use of our reasoning and reflective capacities 
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